Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together by Zhaofeng, Huang et al.
1 
 
Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play 
Together 
Fayssal M. Safie Ph.D, NASA/MSFC  
Richard G. Stutts, NASA/MSFC  
Zhaofeng Huang, Ph.D, Aerojet Rocketdyne  
Key Words: Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability Engineering, Design 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, 
NASA and aerospace industry has extensively used 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods to assess, 
understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles, 
especially manned space flight missions. Another area that was 
given a lot of emphasis at NASA is reliability engineering. Both 
PRA and reliability are probabilistic in nature; however; the 
reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals 
with loss of function, while PRA is a system scenario based risk 
assessment process that deals with Loss of Mission (LOM), 
Loss of Vehicle (LOV), and Loss of Crew (LOC). This paper 
discusses the PRA process and the reliability engineering 
discipline in details. It discusses their differences and 
similarities and how they are used as complementary analyses 
to support design and flight decisions. In summary: 
 Reliability Engineering is a discipline that involves the 
application of engineering principles to the design and 
processing of products; both hardware and software 
intended to minimize the loss of functions. 
 PRA at NASA is a process that deals with system risk 
focusing on understanding the system risk scenarios that 
could lead to LOM, LOV, and LOC. 
 PRA and reliability engineering are two different areas 
serving different functions in supporting the design and 
operation of launch vehicles. However, PRA as a risk 
assessment, and reliability as a metric could play together 
in a complementary manner in assessing the risk and 
reliability of launch vehicles. 
 In general, reliability analyses should be used as a critical 
data source for PRA.     
1 INTRODUCTION 
PRA methodology is one of the probabilistic analysis 
methods that NASA brought from the nuclear industry to assess 
the risk of LOM, LOV and LOC for launch vehicles. PRA is a 
system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination 
of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and 
probability and statistical data to analyze the risk of a system, a 
process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three 
basic questions: What can go wrong? How likely is it? What is 
the severity of the degradation? 
Since 1986, NASA, along with industry partners, has 
conducted a number of PRA studies to predict the overall 
launch vehicles risks. Planning Research Corporation [1] 
conducted the first of these studies in 1988. In 1995, Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) conducted a 
comprehensive PRA study [2]. In July 1996, NASA conducted 
a two-year study (October 1996 - September 1998) to develop 
a model that provided the overall Space Shuttle risk and 
estimates of risk changes due to proposed Space Shuttle 
upgrades [3].  
After the Columbia accident, NASA conducted a PRA on 
the Shuttle External Tank (ET) foam. This study was the most 
focused and extensive risk assessment that NASA has 
conducted in recent years. It used a dynamic, physics-based, 
integrated system analysis approach to understand the 
integrated system risk due to ET foam loss in flight [4]. 
Most recently, a PRA for Ares I launch vehicle has been 
performed in support of the Constellation program. 
Reliability, on the other hand, addresses the loss of 
functions. In a broader sense, reliability engineering is a 
discipline that involves the application of engineering 
principles to the design and processing of products, both 
hardware and software, for meeting product reliability 
requirements or goals. It is a very broad design-support 
discipline. It has important interfaces with many other 
engineering disciplines. Reliability as a figure of merit (i.e. the 
metric) is the probability that an item will perform its intended 
function(s) for a specified mission profile. In general, the 
reliability metric can be calculated through the analyses using 
reliability demonstration and reliability prediction 
methodologies. Reliability analysis is very critical for 
understanding component failure mechanisms and in 
identifying reliability critical design and process drivers.  
The following sections discuss the PRA process and 
reliability engineering in detail and provide an application 
where reliability analysis and PRA were jointly used in a 
complementary manner to support a Space Shuttle flight risk 
assessment.  
2 THE PRA PROCESS 
PRA is a systematic process of analyzing a system, a 
process, or an activity to answer three basic questions: 
• What can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded 
performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired 
consequences of interest)? 
• How likely is it (probabilities)? 
• What is the severity of the degradation 
(consequences)? 
In a PRA process, risk assessment is the task of 
generating the triplet set: 
R  RISK  { S
i
, P
i
, C
i
 }, 
Where S is the scenario, P is the likelihood of the scenario, and 
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C is the consequence of the scenario respectively as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.  The Risk Triplet Set 
 
 Following the steps shown in Fig 2, the first step in a PRA 
process is to understand the system under consideration.  The 
second step is to develop a Master Logic Diagram (MLD) to 
identify all the scenarios for a given system undesirable event 
called the top event. The MLD logically traces the different 
events that can lead to the top event. In general, the events are 
expanded using event trees, fault trees, or event sequence 
diagrams. These logic models are used to identify the failures 
needed in order for an event to propagate to the undesirable 
event. 
Event trees and event sequence diagrams are inductive 
models that start with an initiating event and then trace through 
the intermediate events (pivotal events) that occur because of 
the initiating event. The intermediate events include failures 
and successes of functions and systems that are called upon as 
a result of the initiating event. Fault trees are deductive models 
that start with a top undesirable event and then trace through 
intermediate events that can result in the top event. The fault 
tree stops at suitably defined basic events.  
Once the event trees, event sequence diagrams, and fault 
trees are completed, the next step is to quantify the risk. The 
quantification involves assigning probabilities to basic events 
in the models and then propagating these probabilities to 
determine the probability of the consequence occurring. The 
basic events in the models are generally component failures, 
human errors, etc. The probabilities for the basic events are 
estimated using PRA databases and expert opinions. 
Uncertainties associated with the estimates are also determined. 
The probabilities and their uncertainties are propagated through 
the models using the logics defined by the models. This 
propagation results in an estimate of the probability and 
associated uncertainty for the consequence occurring.  
The results of the PRA are used to identify the major 
contributing elements (i.e. initiating events, pivotal events, and 
basic events) to the overall risk and quantify the risk 
significance of these contributing elements, helping focus on 
where improvements will be effective. For further details on 
PRA and PRA applications, see [1-3]. 
 
 Figure 2.  The PRA Process 
 
It is worth noting that a PRA process is complex in nature 
and requires analysts with special expertise. As shown in Fig. 
3, in order to perform a PRA exercise, PRA team members 
should have a good understanding of engineering science, an 
understanding of the product being analyzed, an understanding 
of logic structures, and an understanding of probability and 
statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  The Skill Set Needed Performing PRA 
3 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND THE RELIABILITY 
METRIC 
As discussed earlier, reliability engineering is a discipline 
that involves the application of engineering principles to the 
design and processing of products, both hardware and software, 
for meeting product reliability requirements or goals. The 
reliability figure of merit is the probability that an item will 
perform its intended function for a specified mission profile. 
The following sections discuss reliability engineering as a 
design discipline and the reliability metric in terms of reliability 
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demonstration and reliability predictions.  
3.1 Reliability Engineering – The Design Function 
To discuss reliability engineering as a design function, we 
need to get into what constitute a reliability case as part of 
“design for reliability”. Fig. 4 shows examples of the techniques 
used to build the foundation for a reliability case.    
The principle aim of the reliability case shown in Fig. 4 is 
to generate the data and the supporting evidence to ensure that 
the product will meet the reliability requirements and achieve 
mission success.  The choice of the techniques is primarily 
dependent upon the quality and quantity of information 
available and is tailored to fit the project or program under 
consideration.  These reliability engineering analyses and 
design techniques are used throughout the design process to be 
effective and to achieve the performance and reliability goals 
set by the program. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  The Reliability Case 
 
It is worth noting that Fig. 4 clearly indicates that designing 
reliable systems requires addressing both the design reliability 
and the process reliability [4, 5]; or in other words, “design it 
right and build it right”.  It is possible that a good design could 
be hard to build or manufacture due to process challenges. 
Many examples were experienced in the Space Shuttle Program 
(SSP). The most recent example is the Space Shuttle External 
Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) reliability issues 
that contributed to the Columbia accident. The following 
examples are provided to illustrate the importance of 
considering both design and process reliability in designing and 
building future launch vehicles.  
The SSP was a very successful program in terms of 
reliability and mission success given its complexity; however, 
two major accidents occurred in the life of the program due to 
design and process unreliability. They were the Challenger and 
the Columbia accidents. For the Challenger accident case, Fig. 
5 shows the field joint design flown on the Challenger and 
previous Shuttle flights.  According to a published report about 
the Challenger accident, the main causes and contributing 
factors were:  
 The zinc chromate putty frequently failed and permitted the 
gas to erode the primary O-rings. 
 The particular material used in the manufacture of the 
shuttle O-rings was the wrong material to use at low 
temperatures. The elastomers become brittle at low 
temperatures. 
All the accident-contributing factors indicate a design 
reliability problem. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Solid Rocket Motor Field Joint 
 
The problem in the Columbia accident was both design 
and process reliability. Fig. 6 shows the area of the ET foam 
loss that contributed to the Columbia accident.  According to a 
published report about the Columbia accident, the causes and 
contributing factors are: 
 A breach in the TPS caused by the left bipod ramp foam 
insulation from the ET striking the left wing leading edge.  
 There were large gaps in NASA's knowledge about the 
foam.  
 Cryopumping and cryoingestion were experienced during 
tanking, launch, and ascent.  
 Dissections of foam revealed subsurface flaws and defects 
as contributing to the loss of foam. 
Unlike the Challenger accident, the Columbia accident 
failure causes were both process and design related allowing 
cryopumping and cryoingestion leading to a breach in the 
TPS. 
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Figure 6.  Bipod ramp foam loss 
 
3.2  The Reliability Metric 
As discussed earlier, the reliability figure of merit or metric 
is the probability that an item will perform its intended function 
for a specified mission profile. This probability can be 
calculated using reliability prediction or reliability 
demonstration. Reliability prediction is the process of 
quantitatively estimating the reliability of a system using both 
objective and subjective data. Reliability prediction is 
performed to the lowest level for which data is available. 
Reliability prediction techniques are dependent on the degree 
of the design definition and the availability of historical data. 
Examples are: 
 Similarity analysis techniques: Reliability of a new design 
is predicted using reliability of similar parts, where failure 
rates are adjusted for the operating environment, geometry, 
material change, etc. 
 Physics-based techniques: Reliability is predicted using 
probabilistic engineering models expressed as loads and 
environment vs. capability 
 Techniques that utilize generic failure rates such as MIL-
HDBK 217, Reliability Prediction of Electronic 
Equipment. 
Reliability Demonstration is the process of quantitatively 
estimating the reliability of a system using objective data at the 
level intended for demonstration. Statistical formulas are used 
to calculate the demonstrated reliability at some confidence 
level. Models and techniques used in reliability demonstration 
include Binomial, Exponential, Weibull models, etc.. Due to the 
high cost and schedule impact of reliability demonstration, most 
programs can only use this method to demonstrate a limited 
reliability comfort level. For example, a reliability goal of .99 
at 95% confidence level requires conducting 298 successful 
tests with no failures. 
4 THE LINK BETWEEN RELIABILITY AND PRA 
Given the PRA and the reliability discussions above it is 
clear PRA and reliability engineering are two different areas 
serving different functions in supporting the design and 
operation of launch vehicles. However, PRA as a risk 
assessment, and reliability as a metric could play together in a 
complementary manner in assessing the risk and reliability of 
launch vehicles. A good example is the ET TPS risk assessment 
shown in Fig. 7. This assessment was used to assess the risk of 
the foam debris hitting the Orbiter and leading to a LOC. 
Starting from the top, the risk assessment, which is simulation 
based, used the ET TPS void distributions derived from the 
dissection data of the ET components under consideration as 
the initial input. The void distributions were then used in a 
fracture mechanics model to generate divots.  The divots 
generated were then transported to evaluate the damage impact 
on the orbiter.  The output of the model was the probability of 
Orbiter damage exceeding a specified tolerance limit set for the 
Orbiter. The risk assessment model, although limited in scope, 
was very critical in understanding and communicating the risk 
of the ET TPS in flight. The results of the risk assessment were 
used as part of the rationale to Return-to-Flight (RTF) after the 
Columbia accident.  
It is important to note that the reliability of the foam 
generated using fracture mechanics was a key input to the 
probabilistic risk assessment. Although this example does not 
represent a full-blown system PRA exercise, the foam failure 
scenario leading to a LOC, was part of the overall Shuttle PRA 
model. This application represents a good illustration of the 
complementary nature of probabilistic risk assessments and 
reliability analyses.  
 
Figure 7.  ET TPS Foam Risk Assessment Logic 
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